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Stocks with higher forecast dispersion earn lower future returns and have a greater upward bias in 
the mean reported earnings forecast in the international markets. Both phenomena are stronger in 
countries with more transparent information environments, more developed stock markets, stronger 
investor protection, greater capital openness, and more intense usage of analysts’ earnings forecasts. 
Using the 1997−98 Asian financial crisis as a natural experiment, we find that both phenomena become 
weaker post crisis in Malaysia, which imposed capital controls, relative to Thailand and South Korea, 
which opened up their financial markets to foreigners. These results suggest that analysts in countries 
with greater demand for their forecasts and hence greater concerns for reputations are more likely to self-
censor their low forecasts, which leads to a stronger dispersion-bias relation and a stronger dispersion 
effect. 
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Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (henceforth DMS) (2002) document the dispersion effect: a 
negative cross-sectional relation between the dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts and future returns 
of U.S. stocks. This is viewed as anomalous because dispersion is often considered as a proxy for risk and 
we would normally expect bearing larger risk to be compensated by higher future expected return. This 
study contains two main new results about the dispersion effect. First, the dispersion effect is an 
international phenomenon. Second, and more importantly, the dependence of the dispersion effect on 
country characteristics provides strong evidence that the dispersion effect is due to analysts’ incentives, 
not to other proposed mechanisms. We consider various country characteristics including information 
environment, stock market development and investor protection. We obtain especially strong evidence 
from a series of difference-in-differences results from the capital control changes in Malaysia, Thailand 
and South Korea during the 1997−98 Asian financial crisis. 
The literature offers three explanations for the dispersion effect. The first explanation by DMS 
(2002), based on Miller’s (1977) theory, posits that forecast dispersion is a proxy for different opinions 
among investors (the difference-in-opinion explanation). Due to short-sale constraints, stock prices reflect 
only optimistic views as investors with pessimistic views cannot trade; this introduces an optimistic bias 
into the prices of stocks about which investors hold divergent opinions (i.e., high-dispersion stocks). The 
second explanation, also by DMS (2002), is that analysts’ incentive structure encourages them to self-
censor their unfavorable earnings forecasts (the analyst-incentive explanation). The more spread out the 
underlying earnings forecasts, the more pessimistic are the self-censored forecasts, and the greater the 
upward bias in the mean reported forecast. This leads to a positive relation between the upward bias in the 
mean reported forecast and the dispersion of analysts’ reported forecasts (henceforth the dispersion-bias 
relation). If investors do not properly adjust for this bias, they will overvalue stocks with higher forecast 
dispersion, which results in a negative relation between forecast dispersion and future stock returns. The 
third explanation by Johnson (2004) argues that forecast dispersion is a proxy for idiosyncratic parameter 
risk. In the presence of leverage, expected returns decrease with idiosyncratic parameter risk, as equity is 
a call option on a firm’s assets and the option value increases with idiosyncratic asset risk (the parameter-
risk explanation).1 
                                                            
1 Two other papers are relevant to our discussion of the dispersion effect. Sadka and Scherbina (2007) 
demonstrate that firms with high forecast dispersion tend to have high trading costs, which explains the 
persistence of the dispersion effect but does not explain why the dispersion effect occurs in the first place. 
Avramov et al. (2009) argue that forecast dispersion reflects uncertainty about current earnings, which is 
one of the components of asset valuation. On the other hand, default risk captures the uncertainty of more 
ingredients used in asset valuation, including current earnings, growth rates, and the cost of equity. Hence, 




We first investigate whether the dispersion effect exists in the international markets. Our answer to 
this question is affirmative. We find that the average  monthly return (both raw and risk-adjusted returns) 
on a portfolio that buys stocks in the lowest dispersion quintile and sells stocks in the highest dispersion 
quintile is positive and significantly different from zero (at a significance level of 0.05) in 19 out 23 
international markets. Pooling firms in all international markets together, we find that in both the 
international markets and the U.S. market, forecast dispersion has a stronger (i.e., more statistically 
significant) return-predictive ability than size, book-to-market, and past stock return during our sample 
period from January 1990 to December 2013.  
We then investigate how the dispersion effect varies across countries. We find that the dispersion 
effect is stronger in countries with more transparent information environments, more developed stock 
markets, greater capital openness, stronger investor protection, and more intense usage of analysts’ 
earnings forecasts. These results are consistent with the prediction from a model which considers cross-
country variation in analysts’ reputational concerns. Similar to Scherbina (2005), this model extends 
DMS’s (2002) and Scherbina’s (2008) analyses on self-censoring to consider analysts’ choice between 
self-censoring and adding an optimistic bias to their true forecasts and the resulting relation between the 
bias and the dispersion in analysts’ reported forecasts. The central idea of the model is as follows. The 
firm manager will severely penalize analysts who report forecasts below the manager’s threshold forecast, 
but will not reward those who report optimistic forecasts above the threshold. Thus, when an analyst’s 
true forecast falls below the threshold forecast, she either self-censors her true forecast or adds an 
optimistic bias to her true forecast to report the threshold forecast. However, adding an optimistic bias 
creates forecast error and damages her reputation. Therefore, in environments where reputation is 
important, she is more likely to choose self-censoring to preserve her reputation. Self-censoring increases 
upward bias in the mean reported forecast relative to the true mean forecast more than adding an 
optimistic bias to report the threshold forecast does.  Furthermore, the bias in the mean reported forecast 
is larger the more dispersed the distribution of analysts’ underlying forecasts (i.e., a larger ) and 
consequently the more dispersed the distribution of analysts’ reported forecasts (i.e., a larger ),2 
indicating a positive dispersion-bias relation. Therefore, in countries where analysts care more about their 
reputations, more analysts will choose self-censoring over adding an optimistic bias, leading to a stronger 
positive dispersion-bias relation and a stronger dispersion effect. Since analysts’ reputational concerns 
rise with investor demand for analyst forecasts (Barniv et al. 2005), the dispersion effect should be 
stronger in countries where investor demand for analyst forecasts is higher. 
                                                            
2As shown in Scherbina (2005), the dispersion in analysts’ reported forecasts (i.e., forecast dispersion) 
increases with the dispersion in analysts’ underlying forecasts. 
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Note that the positive dispersion-bias relation is unique to the analyst-incentive explanation. We 
find that 1) the positive dispersion-bias relation documented by DMS (2002) in the U.S. also exists in the 
international markets, and 2) this positive dispersion-bias relation is stronger in countries where investor 
demand for analyst forecasts is higher. These findings provide further support to the analyst-incentive 
explanation. 
To address the concern that the cross-country findings are driven by unobservable variables, we 
conduct difference-in-differences tests using the 1997-98 Asian financial crisis as a natural experiment. In 
response to the crisis, South Korea and Thailand asked for help from IMF, which required opening their 
financial markets to foreigners, while Malaysia imposed sweeping capital controls (Dornbusch 2001, 
Kaplan and Rodrik 2001). Consequently, we expect the demand for analyst forecasts and hence analysts’ 
reputational concerns in Malaysia to become relatively weaker as its market becomes less open after the 
crisis. The results from the difference-in-differences tests reveal that analysts’ reputational concerns, and 
hence the dispersion effect and the positive dispersion-bias relation in Malaysia became weaker after the 
crisis relative to South Korea and Thailand, consistent with the analyst-incentive explanation. 
In contrast, our evidence does not support the difference-in-opinion explanation or the parameter-
risk explanation. A commonality in these two explanations is that analysts’ disagreement about a firm’s 
earnings is used as a proxy for investors’ disagreement about a firm’s value. 3 This proxying process 
requires two mappings: one from “analysts” to “investors” and the other from “earnings” to “firm value”. 
Because (1) firm value is more difficult to forecast than earnings and (2) investors are less experienced 
than analysts, a given level of forecast dispersion should translate into a higher level of disagreement on 
firm value among investors, especially in a more uncertain environment where information is less precise 
and less available. Thus, both explanations suggest that the dispersion effect should be stronger in 
countries with more uncertain information environments. However, our finding shows the opposite. 4  
We make two contributions to the literature. First, using international data, we provide an out-of 
sample test for DMS’s (2002) finding. Second, our cross-country analyses and difference-in-differences 
tests offer new evidence that is most consistent with the analyst-incentive explanation for the dispersion 
effect. 5  This is especially important, as the current literature seems to have largely ignored this 
                                                            
3  The parameter-risk explanation in Johnson (2004) rests on the foundation that uncertainty (i.e., 
parameter risk) and investors' disagreement on firm value are closely linked. 
4 Such mappings are not required in the analyst-incentive explanation. 
5 In untabulated analyses, we examine the impact of firm leverage on the dispersion effect in international 
markets. According to Johnson (2004), one prediction from the parameter-risk explanation is that the 
dispersion effect should grow stronger as leverage becomes higher. The empirical results of testing this 
prediction in the U.S. market are mixed. Johnson (2004) finds results consistent with this prediction. On 
the other hand, both Sadka and Scherbina (2007) and Avramov et al. (2009) find that leverage is not 
relevant to the dispersion effect when they use a different U.S. sample from that in Johnson (2004). We 
do not find support for this prediction in the international markets. We also examine the impact of short 
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explanation; most of the studies mentioning the dispersion effect refer only to the difference-in-opinion 
explanation or to a less extent, the parameter-risk explanation.  
2. Sample and data  
The data on analysts’ earnings forecasts are obtained from the Institutional Brokers Estimate 
System (I/B/E/S). Dispersion in analysts’ earnings forecasts (DISP) is calculated as the ratio of the 
standard deviation of analysts’ current fiscal-year annual earnings-per-share forecasts (i.e., forecasts of 
forthcoming earnings-per-share) to the absolute value of the mean forecast, 6 as reported in the I/B/E/S 
Summary History file. In the standard issue of I/B/E/S data, analyst forecasts are adjusted historically for 
stock splits, which renders these data unsuitable for the analysis of forecast dispersion (DMS 2002). 
Accordingly, we follow DMS (2002) in estimating forecast dispersion on the basis of analyst forecasts 
unadjusted for stock splits. 
We retrieve the monthly return indexes of individual stocks (U.S. dollar denominated) from 
Thomson Datastream to calculate the monthly returns of non-U.S. stocks. We include both domestic and 
foreign stocks that are listed on the major stock exchange(s) in each country, as in Chui et al. (2010). We 
also include only primary listings. Following McLean et al. (2009), we trim the returns of non-U.S. stocks 
at the top and bottom 1% within each country, as many of these extreme returns are likely to be the result 
of coding error. The returns of U.S. stocks, which are not trimmed, are taken from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We also trim the forecast error, calculated as the absolute value of 
the ratio of the difference between monthly mean reported forecast and actual earnings-per-share to the 
latter, at the top 99% within each country, 7 because these forecasts are likely to be the results of data 
errors. We obtain the market value of equity (MV) and book-to-market ratio (BM) for non-U.S. stocks and 
U.S. stocks from Datastream and COMPUSTAT, respectively. We calculate return momentum (MOM) 
for each stock as its buy-and-hold return over the previous six months. We require all observations to 
have non-missing DISP and MV. As explained later, we create dummy variables for observations with 
missing BM and MOM. To eliminate the effects of outliers, we follow McLean et al. (2009) to winsorize 
the above characteristics (i.e., DISP, MV, BM and MOM) within each country at the top and bottom 1%. 
Furthermore, for each month we limit our sample to countries with at least 100 observations. This is 
                                                                                                                                                                                               
sale constraints on the dispersion effect in international markets. Using the legality of short selling as a 
proxy for the short sale constraint, we find that there is no significant difference in the dispersion effect 
between countries where short selling is banned and those where short selling is permitted. The 
information on whether short selling is allowed in a country is from Bris et al. (2007). However, this 
finding should be interpreted with caution because there are only a few countries in our sample where 
short selling is not allowed, which results in a very small variation of short sale constraints in our 
international sample. 
6 We regard DISP as missing if the mean forecast is 0. Results are similar if we assign the highest value of 
DISP in a country to observations with mean forecast equal to 0.  
7 The lower bound of forecast error is 0. 
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because we would like each dispersion quintile portfolio to have at least 20 stocks each month so that a 
portfolio return is less likely to be influenced by the extreme returns of some individual stocks in the 
portfolio. Finally, we exclude countries with a return history of fewer than 60 months over our sample 
period, which runs from February 1990 to December 2013. The choice of 60 is a trade-off result between 
two factors: a long return history for each country and a large number of countries in our sample.  
Our final sample, which is described in Table 1, comprises 1,241,339 stock-month observations 
from 23 non-U.S. countries and 902,373 stock-month observations from the U.S. 8 The U.S. accounts for 
42.1% of the total observations, by far the largest proportion, followed by Japan and the U.K., which 
account for 10.2% and 8.6% of the total, respectively. The number of months over the sample period is 
different across countries due to data availability. In columns 3 – 6 of Table 1, we show for each country 
the time-series average of monthly number of stocks, the percentage of I/B/E/S stocks covered by at least 
two analysts, and the percentage of Datastream stocks covered by I/B/E/S. In the last five columns of 
Table 1, we report for each country the time-series average of the median values of the following stock 
characteristics: number of analysts covering the stock (COV), natural logarithm of market value of equity 
(LOGMV), natural logarithm of book-to-market ratio (LOGBM), return momentum (MOM), and forecast 
dispersion (DISP).  
3. The dispersion effect in the international markets 
In this section, we investigate whether forecast dispersion can predict the cross-section of stock 
returns in the international markets using both the portfolio strategy and the regression method.  
3.1 Portfolio strategy 
At the end of each month, we assign all of the stocks within each country to five quintiles (D1 to 
D5) based on forecast dispersion. D1 includes stocks with the lowest forecast dispersion, while D5 
includes stocks with the highest forecast dispersion. After being assigned to portfolios, stocks are held for 
one month. D1 − D5 is the hedge portfolio that holds a long position in stocks within D1 and a short 
position in stocks within D5 (henceforth called the dispersion portfolio). The monthly return of each 
portfolio is calculated as the equal-weighted average of the returns of all of its stocks. 9 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the results of the portfolio strategy for each of the 23 non-U.S. countries. 
With the exception of China and Turkey, the average monthly returns on the dispersion portfolio (D1 − 
D5) are positive in all of the non-U.S. countries; that is, in 21 of these countries. Under the null 
hypothesis that the dispersion effect is a random event, the probability of observing a positive (negative) 
average monthly return on D1 − D5 in any country is 0.5. Assuming that the sign of the average monthly 
                                                            
8 Please see the online appendix for the detailed sample selection procedures for non-U.S. stocks. 




return on D1 − D5 in any country follows a Binomial distribution (χ ~ B (N=23, P=0.5)),10 the probability 
of observing 21 positive signs among the 23 non-U.S. countries is 0.000. This result thus strongly rejects 
the null hypothesis, which suggests that the dispersion effect is a prevalent anomaly around the world. 
Furthermore, the magnitude of the average monthly return on the dispersion portfolio is significantly 
positive (at a significance level of 0.05) in 19 of the 23 non-U.S. countries. The results based on the risk-
adjusted returns (i.e., FF3 alpha) show a similar pattern. FF3 alpha is the intercept from regressing the 
monthly returns of the dispersion portfolio (D1 − D5) onto the local Fama-French three factors in each 
country. We follow Ang et al. (2009) to calculate the local Fama-French three factors. The local market 
factor is the value-weighted excess return of the stocks in each of our non-U.S. countries over the one-
month U.S. T-bill rate. The local size (book-to-market) factor is the value-weighted return of the portfolio 
which consists of one third of the stocks with the smallest size (the highest book-to-market) in each non-
U.S. country minus the return of the portfolio consisting of one third of the stocks at the opposite end.  
Panel B of Table 2 reports the results of the aggregate portfolio strategy in the non-U.S. countries. 
Following Chui et al. (2010), we create two types of non-U.S. aggregate dispersion portfolios. We refer to 
the first type as the country-average dispersion portfolio, and the second as the country-composite 
dispersion portfolio. For each month, the country-average dispersion portfolio equally weights each 
country-specific dispersion portfolio, as described in Panel A. The composite dispersion portfolio is 
weighted more toward countries with more stocks. Specifically, at the end of each month, all stocks in 
each of the non-U.S. countries are ranked in ascending order based on forecast dispersion. Stocks in the 
top quintile of forecast dispersion in each country are assigned to the “D5” composite portfolio, and the 
bottom quintile stocks are assigned to the “D1” composite portfolio. The results in Panel B show that the 
time series average of the monthly return on the country-average dispersion portfolio is 0.77, and its t-
statistic is 6.12. The time series average of the monthly return on the country-composite dispersion 
portfolio is 0.73, and its t-statistic is 5.54. The t-statistics are calculated based on Newey-West (1994) 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent standard errors.11  
The results based on the risk-adjusted returns show a similar pattern as well. The FF3 alpha of the 
country-average portfolio is the intercept from regressing the country-average dispersion portfolio (D1 − 
D5) onto the country-average Fama-French three factors, which are the value-weighted average of each of 
the three local factors among our non-U.S. countries. The FF3 alpha of the country-composite portfolio is 
the intercept from regressing the country-composite dispersion portfolio (D1 − D5) onto the country-
composite Fama-French three factors. The construction of the country-composite Fama-French three 
factors is similar to that of the country-average factors, except that greater weights are put on countries 
                                                            
10 The binomially distributed random variable χ is the sign on the dispersion effect in a financial market. 
11As suggested by Newey and West (1994), we select the lag length (L) that equals the integer portion of 
12(T/100)2/9, where T is the number of observations. 
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with more stocks as in the construction of the country-composite dispersion portfolios. The FF3 alpha of 
the country-average dispersion portfolio is 1.05, and its t-statistic is 6.17. The FF3 alpha of the country-
composite dispersion portfolio is 1.29, and its t-statistic is 8.21. 
3.2 Regression analysis 
We run the following Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions on both non-U.S. and U.S. 
stocks, respectively: 
RETi,t+1 = β0 + β1 DISPi,t + β2 LOGMVi,t + β3 LOGBMi,t + β4 BMDUMi,t  
+ β5 MOMi,t + β6 MOMDUMi,t + εi,t+1. (1) 
RETi,t+1 is the return of stock i in month t+1. Following Pontiff and Woodgate (2008), we create a book-
to-market dummy variable (BMDUM). If the book value of equity is either missing or negative, then we 
assign both LOGBM and BMDUM values of zero. Otherwise, BMDUM is set to one. Similarly, we create 
a momentum dummy variable (MOMDUM). If the buy-and-hold return over the previous six months is 
unavailable, then we assign both MOM and MOMDUM values of zero. Otherwise, MOMDUM is set to 
one. The use of BMDUM and MOMDUM allows us to include stocks with missing LOGBM or MOM in 
the regression without influencing the inference of the LOGBM and MOM slope coefficients (Pontiff and 
Woodgate 2008). Following Chui et al. (2010), we use Newey-West (1994) heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation consistent standard errors to compute the t-statistics on the Fama-MacBeth coefficients.  
The results of the regression analyses are reported in Panel C of Table 2. The coefficients on DISP 
are negative and significant in the regressions carried out on non-U.S. stocks, which suggests that forecast 
dispersion has a significant and persistent ability to predict cross-sectional returns, both across countries 
(without country dummies) and within a country (with country dummies). In addition, the results show 
that among both non-U.S. and U.S. stocks, the t-statistic of the coefficient on DISP is greater than that of 
LOGMV, LOGBM, or MOM. These results suggest that the dispersion effect is more significant than the 
size, value and momentum effects during our sample period. 
4. Determinants of cross-country differences in the dispersion effect 
In section 3, we observed a wide variation in the strength of the dispersion effect across countries. 
In this section, we investigate how this effect is associated with country characteristics. As will become 
clearer later, this investigation can help shed light on the alternative explanations for the dispersion effect 
mentioned in the introduction.  
Since we have a long sample period which ranges from 1990 to 2013, some country characteristics 
are likely to change substantially over time. Hence, we use the most recent available information to 
construct a country characteristic which varies by year. In order to allow for comparison across years, 
each year, we transform the values of each country characteristic to decile rankings (scaled between 0 and 
1) by sorting them in ascending order into 10 groups. As explained in regression (2) of section 4.1, we use 
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the time-series average ranking of each country characteristic during the previous five years (i.e., year t-5 
to year t-1) to match with the forecast dispersion of year t. We explain the choices and definitions of these 
country characteristics when appropriate in the remaining part of the paper. Table 3 reports the Spearman 
correlations among these country characteristics based on their time-series average rankings over the 
whole sample period.  
4.1 Information environment and the dispersion effect across countries 
We start our investigation with a country’s information environment. This is because the main 
variable causing the dispersion effect (i.e., forecast dispersion) is likely to be affected by information 
environment. Furthermore, as explained later, information environment is predicted to have a systematic 
and potentially different impact on the strength of the dispersion effect under each of the three 
explanations. We follow Bushee and Friedman (2016) to construct a country-year panel of information 
environment using the CIFAR index and the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report 
(GCR). For 1990 – 1994, we use the 1990 CIFAR values, as reported in La Porta et al. (1998). For 1995 – 
1998, we use the 1995 CIFAR values, obtained from Bushman et al. (2004). The 1990 (1995) CIFAR 
index is created by examining and rating companies’ 1990 (1995) annual reports on their inclusion and 
omission of 90 items. These indexes have been widely used in prior studies as a proxy for a country’s 
information environment (e.g., La Porta et al. 1998, Bhattacharya et al. 2003, Bushman et al. 2004), but 
they are not available after 1995. Since 1999, the annual GCR has included data on either the quality of 
disclosure or accounting standards based on the extensive Executive Opinion Survey. 12 The survey data 
have also been used in previous literature (e.g., Gelos and Wei 2005, Jin and Myers 2006, Bushee and 
Friedman 2016). Hence, from 1999 to 2012, we use the annual GCR score as a proxy for information 
environment. In order to ensure comparison across years, we transform the values of the CIFAR index or 
GCR score into decile rankings (scaled between 0 and 1) each year. A higher ranking indicates greater 
information transparency. The correlation matrix in Table 3 shows that across countries, the Spearman 
correlation between the average ranking of information environment and the average ranking of forecast 
dispersion is -0.454 (pvalue = 0.026 in unreported result), suggesting that forecast dispersion is generally 
higher in countries with more opaque information environments. 
We then examine the impact of information environment on the dispersion effect across countries. 
As explained in the introduction, both the difference-in-opinion explanation and the parameter-risk 
explanation predict a stronger dispersion effect in countries with more uncertain information 
                                                            
12 The GCRs in 1999 and 2000 report the average country-level response to the question “The level of 
financial disclosure is extensive and detailed (1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly agree).” From 2002 
onwards, the GCR reports the average country-level response to the following question: “In your country, 
how would you assess financial auditing and reporting standards regarding company financial 
performance? (1 = extremely weak; 7 = extremely strong).” This survey question is not available in the 
2001 GCR, so we extend the GCR score in 2000 to 2001.  
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environments. The analyst-incentive explanation also suggests that a country’s information environment 
would have a systematic impact on the dispersion effect, but the directional prediction is uncertain 
according to a model that we build on this explanation (presented in the appendix). 
Similar to Scherbina (2005), this model extends DMS’s (2002) and Scherbina’s (2008) analyses on 
self-censoring to consider analysts’ choice between self-censoring and adding an optimistic bias to their 
true forecasts and the resulting dispersion-bias relation. The model also examines how this choice varies 
with the degree of analysts’ reputational concerns across countries, which enables us to predict how the 
dispersion-bias relation and the dispersion effect vary across countries.  
In the model, we assume that the firm manager will penalize severely those analysts who issue 
forecasts that are some certain standard deviations below the mean of the underlying distribution of 
analysts’ forecasts (henceforth the manager’s threshold forecast). Scherbina (2005) cites the risk of being 
cut off from inside sources of information and losing one’s livelihood as an example of the penalty. We 
further assume that analysts are not rewarded for reporting optimistic forecasts above the threshold 
forecast. Consequently, when an analyst’s true earnings forecast is lower than the manager’s threshold 
forecast, she has two choices: (1) adding an optimistic bias to her true forecast to report the manager’s 
threshold forecast; and (2) self-censoring her low true forecast. Each choice carries a cost. Adding an 
optimistic bias generates reputational loss from issuing an incorrect forecast, creating forecast error. Self-
censoring may create a temporary loss of clients and perhaps also the erosion of good rapport with the 
manager, who may view self-censoring analysts as less cooperative than those who choose to add an 
optimistic bias. Unlike adding an optimistic bias, self-censoring does not damage reputation. 
Consequently, in countries where analysts have greater reputational concerns, more analysts with low true 
forecasts will choose self-censoring over adding an optimistic bias. As self-censoring generates a greater 
upward bias in the mean reported forecast than reporting the manager’s threshold forecast, more self-
censoring would lead to a greater upward bias. In the appendix we show that the upward bias is larger the 
more dispersed the distribution of analysts’ underlying forecasts and that the dispersion in analysts’ 
underlying forecasts and the dispersion in analysts’ reported forecasts are positively related. Together, 
these arguments imply that in countries where analysts have greater reputational concerns, there would be 
a stronger positive relation between the dispersion in analysts’ reported forecast and upward bias in the 
mean reported forecast (i.e., the dispersion-bias relation) and hence a stronger dispersion effect.  
Analysts’ reputational concerns become more important where the demand for analyst forecasts is 
higher, because with higher demand, the rewards for gaining reputation are more likely to outweigh the 
costs of gathering and processing information (Barniv et al. 2005). Consequently, how a country's 
information environment affects the dispersion effect depends on its impact on investor demand for 
analyst forecasts. On the one hand, in countries with more opaque information environments, fewer 
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investors may be willing to participate in the stock market due to the psychological phenomenon of 
uncertainty aversion (e.g., Dow and Werlang 1992, Chen and Epstein 2002, Knox 2003, Easley and 
O’Hara 2009), which leads to lower demand for analyst forecasts. On the other hand, analysts might be 
the only information source for investors in countries with more opaque information environments, which 
leads to greater demand for analyst forecasts.  
As a result, it is an empirical question whether the dispersion effect will be stronger or weaker in 
countries with more opaque information environments. If it is stronger, the results are consistent with all 
three explanations.  If it is weaker, the results favor the analyst-incentive explanation over the other two 
explanations.  
We use the following Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression (2) to examine the impact 
of information environment on the dispersion effect across countries. The specification is the same as the 
one used by McLean et al. (2009) in their investigation of the determinants of cross-country differences in 
the share issuance effect.13 
RETi,j,t+1 = β0 + β1 DISPi,j,t + β2 LOGMVi,j,t + β3 LOGBMi,j,t + β4 BMDUMi,j,t  
+ β5 MOMi,j,t + β6 MOMDUMi,j,t + β7 DISPi,j,t × CHARj,t + β8 CHARj,t + εi,j,t+1. (2) 
RETi,j,t+1 is the return of stock i in country j in month t+1. CHARj,t denotes the characteristic of country j 
in month t. It is calculated as country j’s average ranking in this characteristic during the previous five 
years before the year in which month t resides. For example, for month t in 1996, CHARj,t is the time-
series average of the yearly ranking of a country characteristic, such as information environment, from 
1991 to 1995 for country j. The definitions of the other explanatory variables are the same as those in 
regression (1). As Table 1 shows, U.S. stocks account for 42.1% of our whole sample, so U.S. stocks are 
likely to exert a great influence on the empirical results. In order to make sure that our cross-country 
results are not driven by U.S. stocks, we focus on non-U.S. stocks when conducting cross-country 
analyses in sections 4 – 6 and section 8. In robustness tests, we conduct all these analyses on a sample 
including U.S. stocks, and our conclusions do not change.14  
The result is reported under “Information Environment” in Table 4. The coefficient on DISP × 
CHAR can be interpreted as the marginal change in the slope of the DISP coefficient per unit change in 
CHAR, and it is our main coefficient of interest. We find that the coefficient on DISP × CHAR is negative 
and significant, suggesting that the negative relation between forecast dispersion and future stock returns 
(i.e., the dispersion effect) is stronger (weaker) in countries with more transparent (opaque) information 
environments. Hence, this result supports the analyst-incentive explanation over the difference-in-opinion 
and parameter-risk explanations.  
                                                            
13 Please refer to section 5.2.2 in McLean et al. (2009).  
14 Results based on a sample including U.S. stocks are available on request. 
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4.2 Other country characteristics  
In this section, we investigate how the dispersion effect is affected by other country characteristics 
which, unlike information environment, have less ambiguous effects on investor demand for analyst 
forecasts.  
Investor demand for analyst forecasts should be higher in countries with more developed stock 
markets. A more developed stock market has fewer trading obstacles. This not only can encourage a 
larger population to participate in the stock market but also can enhance trading activities among existing 
investors, which in turn increases demand for analyst forecasts. Following previous literature (e.g., Levine 
and Zervos 1998, La Porta et al. 2006, McLean et al. 2009, Titman et al. 2013), we use the ratio of stock 
market capitalization to gross domestic product (GDP) (Mktcap) as a proxy for stock market development. 
We retrieve the annual Mktcap for each country from 1990 to 2012 from the World Development 
Indicator provided by the World Bank at http://www.worldbank.org.  
Investor protection should also have a positive impact on investor demand for analyst forecasts. In 
countries with stronger investor protection, investors believe that they are less likely to be expropriated by 
insiders, which not only can encourage more investors to participate in the stock market, but also can 
encourage existing investors to actively seek information for trading purposes (La Porta et al. 1997, Lins 
and Warnock 2004, Giannetti and Koskinen 2005, Giannetti and Simonov 2006). This in turn increases 
investor demand for analyst forecasts. Our proxy for investor protection is a country’s legal origin (Law). 
La Porta et al. (1998) show that common law countries tend to have stronger investor protection than civil 
law countries. We obtain this information from Professor Andrei Shleifer’s website at 
http://scholar.harvard.edu/shleifer/publications (Djankov et al. 2008). 
Investor demand for analyst forecasts would be higher in countries with fewer capital controls (i.e., 
greater capital openness). Removing capital controls in a country can encourage foreign investment, 
including investment in the country’s equity market, which can in turn increase demand for analyst 
forecasts. We construct a country-year panel of capital control in the following way. For 1990 – 1998, we 
use the annual capital control measure in Miniane (2004), which can be downloaded at 
. 15  Since a greater value in Miniane 
(2004) indicates greater capital control, we use (1− raw value) to transform the raw values downloaded 
from Miniane (2004). We denote this variable as Miniane. Since 1999, GCR has also reported the average 
country-level response to the following survey question: “Foreign ownership of companies in your 
country is (1 = rare, limited to minority stakes, and often prohibited in key sections, 7 = prevalent and 
encouraged).” We use the annual GCR score as a proxy for capital openness from 1999 to 2012 and 
                                                            
15 Miniane’s (2004) capital control measure is available until 2000 and for 21 countries in our sample. 
Hence, starting from 1999, we use GCR score as a proxy for capital control. GCR scores are available for 
all countries in our sample.  
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denote it as GCR_CO. A higher value indicates greater capital openness irrespective of whether Miniane 
or GCR_CO is used as our proxy.  
Finally, investor demand for analyst forecasts should also be higher in countries where investors 
exhibit more intense usage of analyst forecasts. We measure the intensity of forecast usage in a country 
by estimating the average price reaction to analysts’ earnings forecast revisions, that is, earnings response 
coefficient (ERC) as defined below. For each country j in year y, we run the following regression (3) 
based on all current fiscal-year annual earnings forecast revisions issued by individual analysts in this 
year. We exclude those forecasts issued during the 10 days around an earnings announcement in order to 
ensure that our ERC estimate is not contaminated by the price reaction to actual earnings announcements.  
Abreti,t =  β0 + β1 FREVi,t + βk Controlki,t + εi,t. (3) 
Abreti,t is average daily abnormal stock return (in percent) during the 5 days (t – 2, t + 2) around a forecast 
revision issued for stock i on date t. Daily abnormal stock return is calculated as stock i’s return minus the 
corresponding value-weighted market return of the country where stock i is primarily traded. FREVi,t 
denotes forecast revision, calculated as the forecast issued by an individual analyst for stock i at date t 
minus this analyst’s previous forecast for the same stock-fiscal year, scaled by the absolute value of the 
latter. We follow previous studies (e.g., Stickel 1991, Gleason and Lee 2003) to use an analyst’s own 
prior forecast, instead of prior consensus forecast, as the benchmark to calculate forecast revision because 
these studies show that the former is a better benchmark than the latter.16 The set of control variables 
(Controlk) includes LOGMV, LOGBM, MOM, BMDUM, MOMDUM (as defined in regression (1)) at the 
end of month prior to the month in which date t resides. Controlk also includes the average daily abnormal 
return (AVRET) and the number of days with zero return (NZERORET) during the past 50 days (from t – 
52 to t – 3) to control for a stock’s return behavior during the days without forecast revisions. In addition, 
Controlk includes the number of days since this analyst’s prior forecast (PREINTERVAL) and the number 
of days until the actual earnings announcement date (POSTINTERVAL) to control for the effect of time 
horizon. Firm fixed effect is also included to control for any unobservable firm effect. Except the dummy 
variables, the explanatory variables are winsorized within each country at the top and bottom 1%. We 
require at least 20 observations in a country-year regression. The coefficient on FREV (β1) captures the 
sensitivity of stock returns to analysts’ earnings forecast revisions, which is our ERC estimate.  
We apply the same regression as in our investigation of information environment (that is, 
regression (2)) to the other country characteristics discussed above. That is, we match the average decile 
ranking (scaled between 0 and 1) of a country characteristic from year y – 5 to y – 1 with the forecast 
                                                            
16 In unreported results, we find that the coefficient on FREV (β1) is greater when FREV is calculated 
based on an analyst’s own prior forecast than on the prior consensus forecast (0.10 versus 0.06 for the 
non-U.S. sample, and 0.43 versus 0.29 for the U.S. sample). This result confirms the findings of previous 
studies that the former is a better benchmark than the latter.  
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dispersion in year y. The results are reported in Table 4. The significantly negative coefficients of DISP × 
CHAR in all columns indicate that in countries with more developed stock markets, stronger investor 
protection, greater capital openness, and more intense usage of analysts’ earnings forecasts, the negative 
relation between forecast dispersion and future stock return is stronger. Taken together, these results 
suggest that in countries where investor demand for analyst forecasts is higher, the dispersion effect is 
stronger.17 Since analysts' reputational concerns increase with investor demand for analyst forecasts, these 
results are consistent with the prediction from our reputational model, thus providing support for the 
analyst-incentive explanation.  
5. Determinants of cross-country differences in the dispersion-bias relation 
One unique prediction of the analyst-incentive explanation is a positive dispersion-bias relation. It 
is through this positive dispersion-bias relation that the dispersion effect ensues. This suggests for each 
result concerning the dispersion effect we have documented above, there should be a parallel result 
concerning the dispersion-bias relation.  
5.1 The dispersion-bias relation in the international markets 
DMS (2002) document a strong positive dispersion-bias relation in the U.S., consistent with the 
analyst-incentive explanation. We test whether this positive dispersion-bias relation extends to the 
international markets using the following regression:18 
BIASi,t = β0 + β1 DISPi,t+ β2 LOGMVi,t+ β3 LOGBMi,t + β4 BMDUMi,t  
+ β5 MOMi,t + β6 MOMDUMi,t + εi,t. (4) 
BIASi,t  is bias in the mean reported forecast for stock i in month t, which is measured as analysts’ mean 
reported earnings-per-share forecast for stock i in month t minus the corresponding actual earnings-per-
share announced in the future, scaled by the absolute value of the latter. The definitions of the explanatory 
variables are the same as those in regression (1). As both forecast dispersion (DISP) and forecast bias 
(BIAS) of a stock are likely to be persistent across time, the time-series correlation in the error term is 
likely to be severe, which renders Fama-MacBeth an inappropriate method in this analysis of dispersion-
                                                            
17 As ERC measures how efficiently investors process the information contained in analysts’ forecast 
revisions, a market with larger ERC would be considered more efficient. Table 3 shows that ERC and the 
proxy for stock market development are highly correlated, suggesting that a more efficient market is also 
more developed. Hence, the two results that the dispersion effect is stronger in countries with more 
efficient markets and also in countries with more developed markets complement each other.  
18 In unreported tables (available on request), we also use the portfolio method (as described in section 3.1) 
to examine the dispersion-bias relation. Specifically, for each country, we calculate the average upward 
bias in the mean reported forecast (BIAS) of each dispersion quintile. We find that the BIAS differential 
between D5 and D1 is positive and significant in all countries we examine.  
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bias relation.19 Therefore, we use pooled regression and calculate test statistics based on standard errors 
clustered by both stock and calendar year when the mean forecasts are reported,20 using the two-way 
clustering method in Thompson (2011). The second column of Table 5 reports the regression result, 
which shows a strong positive relation between DISP and BIAS, confirming the existence of a positive 
dispersion-bias relation in the international markets. 
5.2 Country characteristics and the dispersion-bias relation across countries 
In this section, we test whether the dispersion-bias relation is stronger in countries where investor 
demand for analyst forecasts is higher, using the following regression: 
BIASi,j,t = β0 + β1 DISPi,j,t+ β2LOGMVi,j,t+ β3 LOGBMi,j,t + β4MOMi,j,t 
+ β5BMDUMi,j,t + β6 MOMDUMi,j,t + β7 DISPi,j,t × CHARj,t+ β8 CHARj,t + εi,j,t. (5) 
The specification of regression (5) is similar to that of regression (2), except that the dependent variable is 
replaced with forecast bias in the current month (BIAS) and that it is a pooled regression. The results are 
reported in columns 3 – 7 of Table 5. For all country characteristics, we find that the coefficients on DISP 
× CHAR are significantly positive, suggesting that the positive dispersion-bias relation is stronger in 
countries where investor demand for analyst forecasts is higher. Hence, these results provide further 
support for the analyst-incentive explanation. 
6. Forecast accuracy as a proxy for analysts’ reputational concerns 
In this section, we examine how forecast accuracy affects the dispersion effect across countries. 
Analysts build up their reputations by issuing accurate forecasts (Scherbina 2008). Higher demand for 
analyst forecasts contributes to greater reputational concerns, which are manifested in greater forecast 
accuracy. Hence, forecast accuracy is a more direct and precise measure of analysts’ reputational 
concerns than are proxies of demand for analyst forecasts. According to our reputational model, we 
expect to find a stronger dispersion effect and a stronger dispersion-bias relation in countries exhibiting 
greater forecast accuracy. Furthermore, we expect forecast accuracy to greatly reduce, if not subsume, the 
explanatory powers of the country characteristics affecting investor demand for analyst forecasts in a 
horse race test.  
We calculate the average forecast accuracy for country j in year y based on all stock-month mean 
reported forecasts whose corresponding earnings are announced in year y. This is to ensure that the 
accuracy of each forecast is known in year y and hence there is no look-ahead bias. Forecast accuracy of 
each stock-month is calculated as (-1) multiplied by forecast error, which is the absolute value of BIAS. 
                                                            
19 Because the time series correlation exists within both the dependent variable and the independent 
variable, the Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regression method is not appropriate in this estimation 
(Peterson 2009). 
20 We tried three variations of two-way clustering: (1) by stock and calendar month, (2) by stock and 
calendar year, and (3) by stock and fiscal year. We chose the second method because it results in the most 
conservative test statistics. 
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As with other country characteristics, each year, we transform the values of country-level forecast 
accuracy to the decile rankings (scaled between 0 and 1). Table 3 shows that across countries, the average 
ranking of forecast accuracy is significantly positively correlated with the average rankings of all country 
characteristics proxying for demand for analyst forecasts, consistent with our argument above that these 
two are linked by analysts’ reputational concerns.  
We first use regression (2) to examine the impact of forecast accuracy on the dispersion effect 
across countries. As before, we match the average ranking of country-level forecast accuracy from year y 
– 5 to y – 1 with forecast dispersion in year y. Results are reported in Panel A of Table 6. The second 
column (under “Forecast Accuracy”) shows a significantly negative coefficient on DISP × Forecast 
Accuracy, suggesting that the dispersion effect is stronger in countries with higher forecast accuracy. 
More interestingly, when we include in the regression both DISP × Forecast Accuracy and DISP × CHAR, 
where CHAR represents various country characteristics proxying for investor demand for analyst forecasts, 
we find that the coefficient on DISP × Forecast Accuracy remains negatively significant, while the 
coefficient on DISP × CHAR loses its significance under all proxies.  
We then use regression (5) to examine the impact of Forecast Accuracy on the dispersion-bias 
relation across countries and find parallel results, which are reported in Panel B of Table 6. Specifically, 
we first find a significantly positive coefficient on DISP × Forecast Accuracy when examining forecast 
accuracy alone. We also find that under all country characteristics except investor protection, DISP × 
CHAR loses its significance or changes to the wrong sign when it’s included in the regression along with 
DISP × Forecast Accuracy. In the case of investor protection, the magnitude of the coefficient on DISP × 
CHAR is reduced from 0.13 to 0.06 after we include DISP × Forecast Accuracy in the regression. Taken 
together, the results in Table 6 provide strong evidence supporting our reputational model and the analyst-
incentive explanation.21 
7.  A natural experiment: The Asian financial crisis of 1997−98 
In sections 5 – 6, we examined how the strength of the dispersion effect and the strength of the 
dispersion-bias relation vary with country characteristics. However, there is concern that the country 
characteristics that we believe affect investor demand for analyst forecasts may simply capture the effects 
of some unobservable variables (the omitted variable problem). To address this concern, we use the 
1997−98 Asian financial crisis as a natural experiment to conduct difference-in-differences tests. During 
the crisis, Thailand, South Korea and Indonesia turned to IMF for help. In return, these countries followed 
IMF prescriptions for recovery, including opening up their financial markets to foreigners (Kaplan and 
Rodrik 2001), which we expect to increase the demand for analyst forecasts for stocks traded in these 
                                                            
21 In unreported tables (available on request), we find that in the U.S. market, both the dispersion-bias 




countries and thus intensify analysts’ reputational concerns. Malaysia took a drastically different 
approach. It imposed sweeping capital controls in September 1998. One of the essential capital controls 
was prohibiting the repatriation of portfolio funds for 12 months (Jomo 2004). These controls resulted in 
an exogenous negative shock to market openness as well as portfolio outflows and inflows in Malaysia 
(Dornbusch 2001). This suggests that after the controls were imposed, the interest in transacting 
Malaysian stocks would decrease, which in turn implies a decrease in the demand for analyst forecasts 
and a decline in analysts’ reputational concerns in Malaysia. The end result would be a weaker dispersion 
effect and a weaker bias-dispersion relation in Malaysia after the crisis, relative to those in South Korea 
and Thailand, according to the prediction of our reputational model.      
We conduct a sequence of difference-in-differences tests. We first test whether the price reaction to 
analysts’ forecast revisions, ERC, which measures investor demand for analyst forecasts, decreases in 
Malaysia post crisis, relative to ERC in Thailand and South Korea. Indonesia is not in our sample as it 
does not meet our sample selection criteria (described in the online appendix). We use the following 
regression on a sub-sample of individual forecast revisions used in regression (3):  
Abreti = β0 + β1 FREVi + β2 FREVi × TREATi+ β3 FREVi × POSTi + β4 FREVi × POSTi × TREATi 
+ β5 TREATi + β6 POSTi + β7 POSTi × TREATi + βk Controlki + εi. (6) 
We define TREATi as a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if a stock is traded in Malaysia (treatment 
sample) and 0 if it is traded in Thailand or South Korea (control sample); and POSTi  as a dummy variable, 
which is equal to 1 if the observation is in 1999, the year after the crisis (based on the forecast revision 
date) and 0 if it is in 1996, the year before the crisis. The dependent variable Abret is the average daily 
abnormal return around a forecast revision, and FREV denotes forecast revision, as in regression (3). The 
set of control variables (Controlk) in regression (6) includes all the control variables in regression (3) and 
also the interactions of each control variable with POST and TREAT, e.g., LOGMV × TREAT, LOGMV × 
POST, LOGMV× POST × TREAT (we use similar sets of interactions for other control variables). We 
also control for time fixed effect based on the forecast revision date. Test statistics are based on standard 
errors clustered by both stock and analyst. The results are reported in Table 7. For simplicity, we omit the 
coefficients on the control variables (Controlk) in Table 7.  
The coefficient on FREVi × TREATi can be interpreted as the difference in ERC between the 
treatment sample and the control sample before the crisis. The coefficient on FREVi × POSTi can be 
interpreted as the difference in ERC before and after the crisis in the control sample. Our main variable of 
interest is the coefficient on FREVi × POSTi × TREATi, which captures the difference-in-differences of 
ERC between the treatment sample and the control sample across the crisis. The results in Panel A of 
Table 7 show that it is significantly negative, suggesting that ERC decreases in Malaysia after the crisis, 
relative to ERC in South Korea and Thailand.  
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We then use the regression below to test the difference-in-differences in forecast accuracy (a proxy 
for analysts’ reputational concerns). The sample is the subset of our main sample used in regression (1).  
ACCURACYi = β0 + β1 TREATi + β2 POSTi + β3 POSTi × TREATi + βk Controlki + εi. (7) 
ACCURACY denotes the accuracy of monthly mean reported forecast, as defined in section 6. In both 
regression (7) and the following regression (8), POST (either 0 or 1) is defined based on the calendar year 
in which the mean forecast is reported. Controlk includes all the control variables in regression (1). Test 
statistics are based on standard errors clustered by both stock and calendar month. The result in Panel B 
of Table 7 shows a significantly negative coefficient on POST × TREAT, suggesting that the forecast 
accuracy in Malaysia decreases after the crisis, relative to that in Thailand and South Korea. 
The results above suggest that the Asian financial crisis induces a negative exogenous shock to 
investor demand for analyst forecasts and analysts’ reputational concerns in Malaysia. Next, we proceed 
to test whether this shock results in a weaker dispersion effect and a weaker dispersion-bias relation in 
Malaysia as predicted by the reputational model. We run the following regression on the subset of our 
main sample used in regression (1) as well: 
RETi (or BIASi) = β0 + β1 DISPi + β2 DISPi × TREATi+ β3 DISPi × POSTi + β4 DISPi × POSTi × TREATi  
+ β5 TREATi + β6 POSTi + β7 POSTi × TREATi + βk Controlki + εi. (8) 
Controlk in regression (8) includes all the control variables in regression (1) and also the interactions of 
each control variable with POST and TREAT. The interpretations of the coefficients of variables in 
regression (8) are similar to those in regression (6). When the dependent variable is RET, the coefficient 
on DISP× POST × TREAT is positive and significant, suggesting that the negative relation between 
forecast dispersion and future stock return (i.e., the dispersion effect) becomes weaker in Malaysia, 
relative to Thailand and South Korea, after the crisis. When the dependent variable is BIAS, the 
coefficient on DISP × POST × TREAT is negative and significant, suggesting that the positive relation 
between forecast dispersion and upward bias in the mean reported forecast (i.e., the dispersion-bias 
relation) becomes weaker in Malaysia relative to Thailand and South Korea after the crisis.   
Overall, this natural experiment provides evidence confirming that it is investor demand for analyst 
forecasts and hence analysts’ reputational concerns that causes the dispersion-bias relation and the 
dispersion effect. This finding thus alleviates the concern that the cross-country results presented earlier 
are caused by omitted variables.   
8. Self-censoring bias and the dispersion effect across countries  
Under pressure from corporate managers, analysts with low true forecasts choose either to add an 
optimistic bias to their true forecasts or to self-censor. Both activities contribute to the upward bias in the 
mean reported forecast, which is BIAS as defined in section 5.1. Our reputational model shows that in 
countries where analysts care more about their reputations, more analysts will choose self-censoring over 
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adding an optimistic bias, which suggests that self-censoring bias would have a greater contribution to 
BIAS in these countries. Hence, we expect both a stronger dispersion effect and a stronger dispersion-bias 
relation in countries where self-censoring bias has a greater contribution to BIAS.  
We calculate self-censoring bias using the formula of Scherbina (2008) as follows: 
Self-censoring bias = EPS - 
∗ ∗ .
 . (9) 
EPS is the mean reported forecast, and EPSmin is the lowest outstanding forecast. N is the number of 
analysts who have issued forecasts, and missing is the number of missing analysts. If N is smaller than the 
number of analysts three months ago, then missing is the decreased number of analysts. If N is greater 
than or equal to the number of analysts three months ago, then missing is 0, which in turn indicates that 
self-censoring bias is 0.  
We measure the contribution of self-censoring to upward bias in the mean reported forecast in a 
country using the ratio (Ratio) of average self-censoring bias to average BIAS in this country. Specifically, 
for each mean reported forecast, we calculate a BIAS and a self-censoring bias. As with BIAS, we scale 
self-censoring bias by the absolute value of actual earnings-per-share. To ensure a level comparison of the 
number of analysts over time in calculating self-censoring bias, we require that in both month t where the 
mean EPS forecast is reported and month t – 3, there are at least two analysts. Both BIAS and self-
censoring bias are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles in this country. We calculate an average self-
censoring bias and an average BIAS for country j in year y based on all available stock-month mean 
reported forecasts whose corresponding actual earnings are announced in year y so that there is no look-
ahead bias. A country-year Ratio is calculated as self-censoring bias divided by BIAS. We regard Ratio as 
missing if average BIAS is negative for a country-year.22 A higher Ratio indicates that analysts’ self-
censoring has a greater contribution to the upward bias in the mean reported forecast.  
Table 3 shows that the time-series average ranking of Ratio and average ranking of Forecast 
Accuracy are positively correlated across countries at 37.4% (pvalue = 0.072 in unreported result), 
suggesting that self-censoring has a greater contribution to upward bias in the mean reported forecast in 
countries where analysts have greater reputational concerns. Ratio is also positively correlated with all the 
country characteristics proxying for investor demand for analyst forecasts, suggesting that analysts are 
more likely to choose self-censoring as demand for their forecasts increases. 
We then examine whether the dispersion effect and the positive dispersion-bias relation are both 
stronger in countries where Ratio is higher. We use regression (2) and regression (5) for each of these two 
tests, respectively, replacing CHAR by the average ranking of Ratio during the past five years. The results 
on the dispersion effect are reported in the last column of Table 4, while the results on the dispersion-bias 
                                                            
22 5 out of 538 country-years have negative average BIAS.  
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relation are reported in the last column of Table 5. We find that higher Ratio intensifies both the negative 
dispersion-return relation and the positive dispersion-bias relation. These results are consistent with our 
expectation.23 They provide further support for our reputational model and hence for the analyst-incentive 
explanation.  
9. Conclusion 
In this study, we find robust evidence of the dispersion effect in the international markets. We 
further find that the dispersion effect is stronger in countries with more transparent information 
environments, more developed stock markets, stronger investor protection, greater capital openness, and 
more intense usage of analyst forecasts. We also document parallel results on the positive dispersion-bias 
relation in the international markets. Taken together, these results suggest that both the dispersion effect 
and the dispersion-bias relation are stronger in countries where investor demand for analyst forecasts is 
higher. As higher demand for analyst forecasts motivates analysts to build up their reputation, these 
results are consistent with the prediction from a reputational model that in countries where analysts have 
greater reputational concerns, analysts are more likely to choose self-censoring their low forecasts over 
adding an optimistic bias to their true forecasts, which leads to a stronger dispersion-bias relation and a 
stronger dispersion effect. As this reputational model is built on the analyst-incentive explanation, these 
results thus provide strong support for the analyst-incentive explanation.  
The findings from a sequence of difference-in-differences tests based on a natural experiment 
involving the 1997−98 Asian financial crisis strengthen the results from our cross-country analyses. We 
find that across the crisis, both price reaction to analyst forecasts and forecast accuracy decrease in 
Malaysia, which imposed capital controls in response to the crisis, relative to those in South Korea and 
Thailand, which opened their financial markets to foreigners as required by IMF. These results suggest 
that after the crisis, investor demand for analyst forecasts and analysts’ reputational concerns decrease in 
Malaysia, relative to South Korea and Thailand. Importantly, we find that after the crisis, both the 
dispersion effect and the positive dispersion-bias relation become weaker in Malaysia relative to the other 
two countries, which lends further support to our reputational model and the analyst-incentive explanation.   
Overall, our results suggest that the analyst-incentive explanation deserves more attention than it 
has been given in explaining the dispersion effect.  
                                                            
23 When analysts self-censor their pessimistic forecasts, the number of analysts issuing forecasts decreases. 
Therefore, another prediction could be that the dispersion effect is stronger in countries where there is a 
greater decrease in the number of analysts issuing forecasts. Although we find that the average decrease 
in analyst coverage is significantly positively related with Forecast accuracy across countries, we do not 
find that it has a significant impact on the dispersion effect (although the sign is right). One possible 
reason is that many other factors contribute to the change in analyst coverage in any given country, 
making it an imprecise measure of analysts’ self-censoring. In contrast, when we employ Scherbina’s 
(2008) formula to calculate the forecast bias generated by the decrease in number of analysts, the 
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Appendix: A model of analysts’ incentives and reputational concerns 
In this model, we first analyse analysts’ incentives in a given country (similar to Scherbina (2005)), 
and then extend our analysis to an international setting where countries differ only in the degree of 
analysts’ reputational concerns.   
We assume that analysts’ earnings forecast  is normally distributed with mean of  and standard 
deviation of : 	~	 , , where  is the firm’s mean expected earnings.24An individual analyst i’s 
forecast  can then be expressed as: 	 , where ∈ ∞, ∞ . 
As in Scherbina (2005), we assume that the firm manager does not like analysts who issue low 
forecasts and will penalize severely those who issue forecasts that are  ( 	 0) standard deviations 
below . That is, we assume 	  as the threshold forecast set by the firm manager, where  is the 
same for all firms. Analysts can be divided into two types: low forecast analysts with 	  and non-low 
forecast analysts with  	 	 .  
In order to avoid the severe penalty from the firm manager, a low forecast analyst i chooses 
between two actions: either deliberately adding an optimistic bias to her true forecast or self-censoring her 
forecast. Each action carries a cost. The cost of adding an optimistic bias is the cost of losing reputation 
due to the issuance of an inaccurate forecast, which is defined as: 
                     Cost of adding an optimistic bias =  ( 	 	 	 	 	                                      (A1) 
This is because the forecast error perceived by analyst i is 	 	  when she reports the threshold 
forecast of 	 	  rather than her true forecast of 	 .  is the degree of analysts’ reputational 
concerns, which is positive and the same for all firms and all analysts in a given country.  is further 
scaled by  to capture the idea that investors are more forgiving (hence, attaching a lower cost) to the 
forecast error if the forecast is for a firm which has more unpredictable earnings and a larger 25.  
The cost of self-censoring does not involve the loss of reputation. Instead, it involves a temporary 
loss of clients and the erosion of good rapport with managers, who may view self-censoring analysts as 
less cooperative than those who choose to add an optimistic bias. We denote this cost as a constant of . 
Thus, cost of self-censoring = . 
Low forecast analysts choose to add an optimistic bias when 	 	 	 , and they choose to 
self-censor their forecasts when 	 	 	 . They are indifferent between these two actions when 
                                                            
24 Scherbina (2005) lays out the structure of public and private signals received by analysts for this 
assumption to hold.  
25 A larger dispersion in analysts’ underlying forecasts (i.e., a larger ) arises because the signals (both 




	 	 	 	 , which occurs at ∗ 	 	 . Therefore, low forecast analysts choose to add an 
optimistic bias when 	 	 ∗; and they choose to self-censor when 	 	 ∗.  
As we focus on analysing the choice of low forecast analysts, we make a simplified assumption that 
non-low forecast analysts (those with 	 ) issue their true forecasts. The implied assumption is that 
analysts are not rewarded for issuing optimistic forecasts above the firm manager’s threshold forecast of 
	 . 
With this set up, analysts would report their forecasts  in the following way: 
	
				 																																																										 	 	
	 																												 	 	 ∗ 	 	
																												 					 	 	 ∗ 	
                                                              (A2) 
Equation (A2) suggests that the distribution of all reported forecasts  is a mixture of a discrete 
distribution and a left truncated normal distribution, with the discrete distribution being a constant of 	
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Where .  is the probability density function. 
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where ( )   and ( )   are the P.D.F. and C.D.F. of a standard normal distribution. 
From (A3) and (A4), we have 
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The upward bias in the mean reported forecast Bias is:  
Bias = 
* *
( ) ( )
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The sensitivity of Bias to the standard deviation of underlying forecasts  is: 
*
* *
( ) ( )
(1 ) 0 since 0
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It can be shown that equation (A7) is positive for any * 0k k  . Note that the standard deviation 
of the reported forecasts ( ) increases with the standard deviation of the underlying forecasts ( ). This 
is because, as shown in equation (A2),   can be described by a mixture of a discrete distribution 
which is a constant at 	 	  and a left truncated normal distribution with interval of ( 	 , 	∞ . As 













, which is an increasing function of . This, combined with the fact 
that the location of the discrete distribution (i.e., the lowest value of ) becomes lower with a greater , 
suggests that and  are positively related, which can be written as  = 	 	 0 . The 
sensitivity of Bias to  (i.e., the dispersion-bias relation) can thus be expressed as: 
* *
( ) ( )
(1 ) 0
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  because ∗ 	 	 . This suggests that in countries where analysts have greater 
reputational concerns, more analysts choose self-censoring over adding an optimistic bias. Thus, it is 
straightforward to show that:  
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Equation (A9) indicates that the positive dispersion-bias relation is stronger in countries where analysts 
have greater reputational concerns. To the extent that investors do not properly adjust the bias embedded 
in forecast dispersion, the positive dispersion-bias relation would translate to a negative relation between 
forecast dispersion and future stock return (i.e., the dispersion effect). Hence, the model predicts that the 








Table 1 Summary statistics 
Our sample consists of data on individual stocks covered by at least two analysts and traded on the major exchanges in each of the 24 countries.  
“Pct. of obs.” is the percentage of observations for each country. “No. of months” is the number of months in the return history of each country 
over the sample period from Feb 1990 to Dec 2013. “No. of stocks” is the time series average of monthly number of stocks. “Pct. of stocks with 
coverage>2” is the time series average of monthly percentage of I/B/E/S stocks covered by at least two analysts. “Pct. of stocks covered by I/B/E/S” 
is the percentage of Datastream stocks covered by I/B/E/S. COV, LOGMV, LOGBM, MOM, and DISP are the time series averages of monthly 
median values of the number of analysts covering a stock, the natural logarithm of market value of equity, the natural logarithm of book-to-market 
ratio, the past six months’ buy-and-hold stock return, and forecast dispersion. Forecast dispersion is calculated as the ratio of the standard 
deviation of analysts’ current fiscal-year annual earnings-per-share forecasts (i.e., forecasts of forthcoming earnings-per-share) to the absolute 
value of the mean forecast. 
















I/B/E/S COV LOGMV LOGBM MOM DISP 
Australia (Australian) 3.2% 272 254 0.78 0.35 6.90 5.94 -0.44 0.06 0.08 
Brazil (Sao Paulo) 0.8% 123 131 0.83 0.23 6.87 6.43 -0.27 0.06 0.22 
Canada (Toronto) 4.4% 286 333 0.81 0.45 5.40 5.66 -0.35 0.04 0.14 
China (Shanghai & Shenzhen) 2.9% 106 585 0.67 0.87 3.83 6.89 -1.03 0.11 0.09 
France (Paris) 3.2% 279 248 0.76 0.50 7.42 6.37 -0.49 0.04 0.11 
Germany (Frankfurt) 3.2% 280 242 0.74 0.43 7.84 5.88 -0.58 0.02 0.13 
Hong Kong (Hong Kong) 3.2% 286 240 0.83 0.77 9.55 6.07 -0.16 0.05 0.11 
India (Mumbai) 1.6% 149 226 0.72 0.78 6.10 6.24 -0.62 0.01 0.10 
Italy (Milan) 1.4% 237 125 0.83 0.56 7.86 6.55 -0.29 0.00 0.16 
Japan (Tokyo & JASDAQ) 10.2% 287 764 0.73 0.96 4.69 6.95 -0.37 0.00 0.10 
Malaysia (Kuala Lumpur & 
MESDAQ) 
2.0% 279 155 0.74 0.77 7.42 5.70 -0.42 0.06 0.12 
Netherlands (Amsterdam) 0.9% 153 132 0.89 0.54 11.21 5.38 -0.46 0.05 0.08 
Norway (Oslo) 0.5% 95 123 0.80 0.61 5.05 5.82 -0.31 0.05 0.18 
Singapore (Singapore) 1.5% 256 123 0.79 0.78 8.66 5.96 -0.28 0.06 0.11 
South Africa (Johannesburg) 1.0% 152 135 0.74 0.49 5.35 6.24 -0.48 0.05 0.07 
South Korea (Korea & 
KOSDAQ) 




Table 1 Continued 
Spain (Madrid) 0.3% 71 105 0.91 0.54 12.67 6.39 -0.35 -0.04 0.12 
Sweden (Stockholm) 1.3% 206 133 0.69 0.32 5.50 5.97 -0.65 0.07 0.12 
Switzerland (Zurich) 1.6% 280 124 0.86 0.35 7.00 6.25 -0.45 0.05 0.11 
Taiwan (Taiwan) 1.7% 232 161 0.68 0.63 4.16 6.45 -0.45 0.00 0.15 
Thailand (Thailand) 0.9% 148 127 0.70 0.74 6.42 5.56 -0.51 0.06 0.12 
Turkey (Istanbul) 1.0% 118 174 0.79 0.54 5.12 3.75 -0.02 0.09 0.27 
U.K. (London) 8.6% 287 642 0.69 0.55 5.33 6.00 -0.60 0.05 0.06 
U.S. (NYSE, AMEX & 
NASDAQ) 




Table 2 International dispersion effect 
At the end of each month, we divide all stocks within each country into five portfolios based on forecast 
dispersion. D1 (D5) includes stocks with the lowest (highest) dispersion. After being assigned to 
portfolios, stocks are held for one month. D1 − D5 is the hedge portfolio that holds a long position in 
stocks of D1 and a short position in stocks of D5. The monthly return (in percentage) of each portfolio is 
calculated as the equal-weighted average of the returns of all of its stocks. Panel A reports the average 
monthly return of each dispersion quintile portfolio and that of the hedge portfolio for each non-U.S. 
country. FF3 alpha is the intercept from regressing the monthly returns of (D1 − D5) onto the local Fama-
French three factors in each country. Panel B reports the non-U.S. aggregate portfolio returns and the U.S. 
portfolio returns. We construct two types of non-U.S. aggregate portfolios. The country-average 
dispersion portfolio equally weights each country-specific dispersion portfolio, as described in Panel A. 
The country-composite dispersion portfolio is weighted more toward countries with more stocks. 
Specifically, stocks in the top (bottom) quintile of forecast dispersion in each country are assigned to the 
“D5” (“D1”) composite portfolio. FF3 alpha for country-average (country-composite) portfolio is the 
intercept from regressing the monthly returns of (D1− D5) onto the country-average (country-composite) 
Fama-French three factors. FF3 alpha of (D1− D5) for U.S. is based on the Fama-French (1993) three 
factors retrieved from Kenneth French’s website. Panel C reports the results of the following Fama-
MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regressions among non-U.S. and U.S. stocks, respectively: RETi,t+1 = β0 
+ β1 DISPi,t + β2 LOGMVi,t + β3 LOGBMi,t + β4 BMDUMi,t + β5 MOMi,t + β6 MOMDUMi,t + εi,t+1. RET is 
monthly stock return. DISP, LOGMV, LOGBM, and MOM are defined in Table 1. BMDUM is a dummy 
variable; if LOGBM is missing, then both LOGBM and BMDUM are assigned values of zero; otherwise 
BMDUM is set to one. MOMDUM is also a dummy variable; if MOM is missing, then both MOM and 
MOMDUM are assigned values of zero; otherwise, MOMDUM is set to one. The t-statistics (in 
parentheses) are based on Newey-West standard errors. 
Panel A Portfolio return 
Country D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D1 − D5 FF3 Alpha 
Australia 1.32 1.13 1.09 0.72 0.02 1.30 (3.64) 1.00(3.51) 
Brazil 1.22 1.13 0.76 0.70 0.19 1.03 (2.84) 0.95(2.73) 
Canada 1.12 1.17 0.77 0.50 0.05 1.07 (3.26) 1.11(4.62) 
China 1.86 2.13 1.94 2.20 1.88 -0.02 (-0.05) 0.32(1.08) 
France 1.06 1.07 0.92 0.81 0.29 0.77 (3.79) 0.98(4.49) 
Germany 0.79 0.70 0.78 0.40 -0.35 1.14 (4.44) 0.94(6.07) 
Hong Kong 1.41 1.28 1.11 0.90 0.52 0.89 (4.06) 1.01(5.48) 
India 0.90 0.83 0.47 0.10 -0.22 1.12 (2.43) 8.88(4.72) 
Italy 0.68 0.49 0.40 0.17 -0.37 1.05 (6.37) 1.03(6.85) 
Japan 0.23 0.31 0.29 0.29 0.16 0.07 (0.58) 0.25(1.64) 
Malaysia 1.07 1.16 0.79 0.79 0.33 0.74 (3.53) 0.95(6.34) 
Netherlands 1.44 1.53 1.23 1.12 0.43 1.01 (3.49) 0.85(3.11) 
Norway 1.36 1.40 1.35 0.84 0.41 0.95 (2.69) 1.05(3.44) 
Singapore 1.15 0.96 0.87 0.80 0.39 0.76 (3.63) 0.85(4.82) 
South Africa 1.26 1.27 0.85 0.75 0.36 0.90 (3.28) 1.37(4.62) 
South Korea 0.83 0.64 0.53 0.52 0.28 0.55 (2.63) 0.69(3.41) 
Spain 0.36 0.16 -0.37 -0.30 -0.60 0.96 (2.08) 0.55(1.40) 
Sweden 1.34 1.36 1.06 0.99 0.41 0.93 (2.63) 0.87(2.71) 
Switzerland 1.05 1.01 0.92 0.80 0.65 0.40 (2.11) 0.46(2.60) 
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Taiwan 0.78 0.56 0.53 0.44 0.03 0.75 (3.92) 1.02(5.44) 
Thailand 0.87 0.77 0.83 0.66 0.21 0.66 (1.73) 0.82(2.17) 
Turkey 2.74 2.99 2.47 2.70 2.86 -0.12 (-0.18) 0.00(0.01) 
U.K. 1.09 1.05 0.99 0.79 0.14 0.95 (3.69) 1.04(3.59) 
Panel B Aggregate portfolio return 
 D1 D2 D3 D4 D5 D1 − D5 FF3 Alpha 
Country-average 1.05 1.01 0.84 0.71 0.28 0.77 (6.12) 1.05 (6.17) 
Country-composite 0.91 0.89 0.76 0.62 0.18 0.73 (5.54) 1.29 (8.21) 
U.S. 1.23 1.19 1.19 1.10 0.90 0.33 (1.04) 0.72 (3.22) 
Panel C  Fama-MacBeth regression 
Variable Estimate t-statistic Estimate t-statistic  Estimate t-statistic 
INTERCEPT 0.57 (1.14) 0.00 (-1.16)  1.03 (1.40) 
DISP -0.38 (-5.97) -0.36 (-7.12)  -0.43 (-2.83) 
LOGMV 0.04 (1.22) 0.12 (4.30)  -0.07 (-1.30) 
LOGBM 0.58 (5.20) 0.60 (5.99)  0.13 (1.47) 
BMDUM 0.54 (4.08) 0.80 (8.32)  0.53 (2.83) 
MOM 0.73 (2.31) 0.91 (3.89)  0.35 (0.99) 
MOMDUM -0.41 (-2.27) -0.41 (-2.80)  -0.04 (-0.10) 
Country fixed effect No Yes   
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Table 3 Country characteristics and their correlations 
This table displays the country characteristics used in Tables 4 – 6. Information Environment is proxied by two country variables: CIFAR and GCR. 
The CIFAR index is created by examining and rating companies’ 1990 (or 1995) annual reports on their inclusion and omission of 90 items. For 
1990 – 1994, we use the 1990 CIFAR values, obtained from La Porta et al. (1998). For 1995 – 1998, we use the 1995 CIFAR values, obtained from 
Bushman et al. (2004). From 1999 onwards, we use the GCR score on either the quality of disclosure or accounting standards based on the World 
Economic Forum’s extensive Executive Opinion Survey, which is reported in the annually published Global Competitiveness Report (GCR). 
Forecast Dispersion is defined in Table 1 (DISP). Stock Market Development is proxied by the ratio of stock market capitalization to gross 
domestic product (GDP) (Mktcap). We obtain annual Mktcap over the period of 1990-2012 from the World Bank at http://www.worldbank.org. 
Investor Protection is proxied by a country’s legal origin (Law), which is equal to one if a country is of common law origin and zero if the country 
is of civil law origin. This information is obtained from Djankov et al. (2008). Capital Openness is proxied by two variables: Miniane and 
GCR_CO. For 1990 – 1998, we use the annual capital control measure in Miniane (2004) (Miniane), obtained at 
https://www.imf.org/External/Pubs/FT/staffp/2004/02/miniane.htm. From 1999 onwards, we use the GCR score (GCR_CO) based on the average 
country-level response to the survey question “Foreign ownership of companies in your country is (1 = rare, limited to minority stakes, and often 
prohibited in key sections, 7 = prevalent and encouraged),” obtained from the annually published Global Competitiveness Report. The extent to 
which investors use analysts’ earnings forecasts (Intensity of Forecast Usage) is proxied by ERC (earnings response coefficient), which captures 
the average price response to analysts’ earnings forecast revisions. For a country-year, we estimate ERC using the following regression based on 
all current fiscal-year annual earnings-per-share forecast revisions issued by individual analysts during this year (except those revisions issued 
during the 10 days around an actual earnings announcement) for stocks traded primarily in this country: Abreti,t =  β0 + β1 FREVi,t + βk Controlki,t + 
εi,t. Abreti,t is average daily abnormal stock return (in percent) during the 5 days (t – 2, t + 2) around a forecast revision issued for stock i on date t. 
Daily abnormal stock return is calculated as stock i’s return minus the corresponding value-weighted market return of the country where stock i is 
primarily traded. FREVi,t denotes forecast revision, calculated as the forecast issued by an individual analyst for stock i at date t minus this 
analyst’s previous forecast for the same stock-fiscal year, scaled by the absolute value of the latter. The set of control variables (Controlk) includes 
LOGMV, LOGBM, BMDUM, MOM, MOMDUM (as defined Table 1) at the end of month prior to the month in which date t resides. It also 
includes the average daily abnormal return (AVRET) and the number of days with zero return (NZERORET) during the past 50 days (from t – 52 to 
t – 3). In addition, it includes the number of days since this analyst’s prior forecast (PREINTERVAL), the number of days until the actual earnings 
announcement date (POSTINTERVAL) and firm fixed effect. The coefficient on FREV (β1) measures the sensitivity of stock return to earnings 
forecast revision, which is our ERC estimate. We require at least 20 observations to estimate a country-year ERC. Forecast Accuracy for each 
country j in year y is measured by averaging the accuracy (ACC) of all monthly mean reported forecasts whose corresponding actual earnings are 
announced in year y. The accuracy of a mean reported forecast is measured as (-1) multiplied by forecast error, which is in turn measured as the 
absolute value of the ratio of the difference between the mean reported forecast and actual earnings-per-share to the latter variable. Ratio is the 
ratio of average self-censoring bias to average upward bias in the mean reported forecast in a country-year, which captures the contribution of self-
censoring to the upward bias in the mean reported forecast. Specifically, for each stock-month mean reported forecast in a country, we first 
calculate a BIAS and a self-censoring bias. BIAS is the upward bias in the mean reported forecast, which is measured as monthly mean reported 
earnings forecast minus actual earnings-per-share, scaled by the absolute value of the latter variable. We use the formula of Scherbina (2008): self-
censoring bias = EPS - 
∗ ∗ .
 to calculate the forecast bias generated by analysts’ self-censoring. EPS is the mean reported 
earnings forecast, and EPSmin is the lowest outstanding forecast. N is the number of analysts who have issued forecasts, and missing is the number 
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of missing analysts. If N is smaller than the number of analysts three months ago, then missing is the decreased number of analysts. If N is greater 
than or equal to the number of analysts three months ago, then missing is 0, which in turn indicates that self-censoring bias is 0. As with BIAS, we 
scale self-censoring bias by the absolute value of actual earnings-per-share. Both BIAS and self-censoring bias are winsorized at the 1st and 99th 
percentiles in a country. We then calculate a country-year self-censoring bias and a country-year BIAS by averaging all stock-month mean reported 
forecasts whose corresponding actual earnings are announced in the current year. A country-year Ratio is calculated as self-censoring bias divided 
by BIAS. Each year, we obtain the decile ranking of a country characteristic by sorting the raw values in ascending order into 10 groups and then 
scaling these rankings to be within the range of [0, 1]. This table shows the Spearman correlations among the country characteristics based on their 

















Forecast Dispersion -0.454* 
        
Stock Market Development 0.699** -0.612** 
        
Investor Protection 0.440* -0.378* 0.595** 
        
Capital Openness 0.712*** -0.309 0.574** 0.147 
        
Intensity of Forecast Usage  0.591** -0.791*** 0.690** 0.592** 0.447* 
        
Forecast Accuracy 0.512** -0.875*** 0.660** 0.586** 0.340* 0.871*** 
        
Ratio 0.136 -0.093 0.271 0.476* 0.240 0.291 0.374* 
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Table 4 Determinants of cross-country differences in the dispersion effect 
 
This table reports the results of the following Fama-Macbeth (1973) regression: RETi,j,t+1 = β0 + β1 DISPi,j,t + β2 LOGMVi,j,t+ β3 LOGBMi,j,t + β4 
BMDUMi,j,t + β5 MOMi,j,t + β6 MOMDUMi,j,t + β7 DISPi,j,t × CHARj,t + β8 CHARj,t + εi,j,t+1. The dependent variable is the return of stock i in country j 
in month t+1. CHARj,t denotes a characteristic of country j, which is the average decile ranking (scaled to be within [0, 1]) of CHAR in country j 
during the past 5 years before the year in which month t resides. For example, for month t in 1996, CHARj,t is the time-series average of the yearly 
decile ranking of CHAR from 1991 to 1995 for country j. CHARs are country characteristics defined in Table 3. The definitions of other 
explanatory variables are the same as those in Table 2. DISP × CHAR is the interaction between DISP and CHAR. The t-statistics (in parentheses) 














       
INTERCEPT 0.38 0.62 0.34 0.49 -0.15 0.12 
(0.65) (1.06) (0.65) (0.79) (-0.26) (0.22) 
DISP -0.01 -0.06 -0.24 -0.11 0.21 0.05 
(-0.07) (-0.49) (-4.08) (-1.00) (1.51) (0.42) 
LOGMV 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.05 0.05 
(1.18) (1.48) (1.72) (1.07) (1.50) (1.59) 
LOGBM 0.61 0.59 0.57 0.58 0.61 0.59 
(4.72) (4.51) (4.87) (4.80) (4.80) (4.68) 
BMDUM 0.54 0.56 0.54 0.50 0.59 0.59 
(3.76) (3.71) (3.90) (2.97) (3.90) (4.08) 
MOM 0.90 0.90 0.70 0.80 0.92 0.95 
(2.64) (2.66) (2.10) (2.37) (3.11) (3.28) 
MOMDUM -0.36 -0.32 -0.40 -0.34 -0.25 -0.26 
(-2.05) (-1.75) (-2.32) (-1.84) (-1.51) (-1.52) 
DISP × CHAR -0.72 -0.63 -0.36 -0.57 -1.31 -1.00 
(-2.95) (-2.79) (-3.36) (-2.81) (-4.09) (-4.05) 
CHAR 0.39 -0.15 0.32 0.31 1.10 0.63 




Table 5 Determinants of cross-country differences in the dispersion-bias relation 
This table reports the results of the following pooled regression: BIASi,j,t = β0 + β1 DISPi,j,t + β2 LOGMVi,j,t + β3 LOGBMi,j,t + β4 BMDUMi,j,t + β5 
MOMi,j,t + β6 MOMDUMi,j,t + β7 DISPi,j,t × CHARj,t+ β8 CHARj,t + εi,j,t. BIASi,j,t is the forecast bias of stock i in country j in month t, which is 
measured as the mean reported earnings forecast in month t for stock i minus actual earnings-per-share announced in the future, scaled by the 
absolute value of the latter variable. The explanatory variables are the same as those in Table 4. The second column reports the result without 
interacting DISP with a country characteristic (CHAR). The t-statistics (in parentheses) are calculated based on standard errors clustered by both 














INTERCEPT 0.64 0.80 0.81 0.70 0.77 0.82 0.77 
(8.57) (8.38) (8.68) (8.63) (9.04) (8.12) (8.13) 
DISP 0.09 0.00 -0.05 0.04 0.00 -0.01 -0.04 
(4.99) (0.09) (-1.00) (1.69) (0.00) (-0.21) (-1.18) 
LOGMV -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
(-8.38) (-9.86) (-8.98) (-9.32) (-10.06) (-8.38) (-8.21) 
LOGBM 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 
(2.51) (1.37) (1.75) (1.85) (1.45) (1.32) (1.85) 
BMDUM -0.07 -0.06 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
(-1.73) (-1.20) (-1.52) (-1.60) (-1.33) (-1.46) (-1.56) 
MOM -0.43 -0.42 -0.42 -0.42 -0.41 -0.42 -0.42 
(-10.00) (-10.24) (-9.63) (-9.97) (-9.75) (-9.49) (-9.40) 
MOMDUM 0.17 0.27 0.22 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.18 
(5.79) (8.61) (9.42) (9.16) (8.95) (9.19) (9.31) 
DISP × CHAR  0.15 0.25 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.32 
 (2.12) (3.56) (5.13) (2.45) (2.33) (4.84) 
CHAR  -0.42 -0.37 -0.20 -0.33 -0.43 -0.30 







Table 6 Country-level forecast accuracy and cross-country differences in the dispersion effect and the dispersion-bias relation 
 
Panel A examines the dispersion effect using the regression from Table 4, while Panel B examines the dispersion-bias relation using the regression 
from Table 5. As with CHAR in the regressions of Table 4 and Table 6, Forecast Accuracy is the average decile ranking of a country’s forecast 
accuracy during the past five years before the year in which month t resides. 
 














       
INTERCEPT -0.22 -0.40 -0.20 -0.27 -0.27 -0.46 
(-0.39) (-0.75) (-0.37) (-0.46) (-0.50) (-0.77) 
DISP 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.09 
(0.85) (0.69) (0.53) (0.44) (0.66) (0.58) 
LOGMV 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.06 
(2.28) (2.49) (2.49) (2.41) (2.48) (2.42) 
LOGBM 0.65 0.66 0.65 0.63 0.64 0.65 
(5.31) (5.33) (5.57) (5.37) (5.34) (5.25) 
BMDUM 0.70 0.71 0.67 0.63 0.71 0.68 
(4.64) (4.58) (4.32) (3.63) (4.71) (4.61) 
MOM 0.97 1.00 0.97 0.91 0.96 1.00 
(3.09) (3.25) (3.37) (3.14) (3.20) (3.33) 
MOMDUM -0.24 -0.23 -0.16 -0.20 -0.26 -0.21 
(-1.53) (-1.60) (-1.04) (-1.28) (-1.67) (-1.45) 
DISP × Forecast Accuracy -1.11 -0.91 -1.13 -0.94 -1.03 -0.64 
(-4.64) (-4.31) (-3.94) (-4.19) (-4.28) (-1.92) 
Forecast Accuracy 0.85 0.19 1.00 0.61 0.74 0.30 
(2.56) (0.45) (2.24) (1.94) (1.94) (0.53) 
DISP × CHAR  -0.23 0.08 -0.15 -0.05 -0.56 
  (-1.04) (0.27) (-0.69) (-0.56) (-1.16) 
CHAR  0.78 -0.31 0.32 0.14 0.94 




Table 6 Continued 
 














       
INTERCEPT 0.84 0.91 0.89 0.85 0.89 0.85 
(8.09) (9.10) (8.96) (8.28) (9.08) (8.02) 
DISP -0.05 -0.05 -0.09 -0.05 -0.06 0.00 
(-1.26) (-0.83) (-1.76) (-1.23) (-1.08) (0.00) 
LOGMV -0.06 -0.07 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 -0.06 
(-8.52) (-9.99) (-8.80) (-9.69) (-10.25) (-8.42) 
LOGBM 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 
(0.37) (0.43) (0.25) (0.50) (0.15) (0.43) 
BMDUM -0.07 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 -0.07 
(-1.45) (-1.54) (-1.58) (-1.64) (-1.48) (-1.49) 
MOM -0.44 -0.43 -0.43 -0.43 -0.42 -0.44 
(-9.64) (-10.01) (-9.35) (-9.62) (-9.58) (-9.55) 
MOMDUM 0.20 0.25 0.21 0.21 0.23 0.21 
(10.46) (10.48) (11.52) (10.80) (11.29) (10.46) 
DISP × Forecast Accuracy 0.32 0.31 0.27 0.26 0.30 0.49 
(3.87) (3.67) (3.33) (2.99) (3.49) (4.25) 
Forecast Accuracy -0.44 -0.25 -0.34 -0.32 -0.32 -0.40 
(-6.53) (-4.44) (-4.61) (-4.32) (-4.34) (-5.00) 
DISP × CHAR  -0.01 0.11 0.06 0.04 -0.26 
  (-0.09) (1.74) (2.61) (0.46) (-2.67) 
CHAR  -0.33 -0.19 -0.11 -0.23 -0.07 






Table 7 1997−98 Asian financial crisis 
Panel A reports the results of the following pooled regression on a sample of individual analysts’ forecast 
revisions for stocks traded in Malaysia, Thailand and South Korea in 1996 (before the crisis) and 1999 
(after the crisis): Abreti = β0 + β1 FREVi + β2 FREVi × TREATi+ β3 FREVi × POSTi + β4 FREVi × POSTi 
× TREATi + β5 TREATi + β6 POSTi + β7 POSTi × TREATi + βk Controlki + εi. TREAT is a dummy variable, 
which is equal to 1 if the forecast revision is for a Malaysian stock and 0 if it is for a stock from Thailand 
or South Korea. POST is equal to 1 if the forecast revision is issued in 1999 and 0 if it is issued in 1996. 
The set of control variables (Controlk) includes the stand alone control variables in estimating ERC as 
explained in Table 3, each of the control variable’s interactions with POST, TREAT and POST × TREAT, 
and time fixed effect based on the forecast revision date.26 Test statistics are based on standard errors 
clustered by both stock and analyst. Panels B and C report the results of the pooled regressions on a 
sample of mean reported forecasts for stocks traded in Malaysia, Thailand and South Korea in 1996 and 
1999. The regression for Panel B is ACCURACYi = β0 + β1 TREATi + β2 POSTi + β3 POSTi × TREATi + βk 
Controlki + εi. The dependent variable is the accuracy of monthly mean reported forecast. Controlk 
includes firm size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum. The regression for Panel C is RETi (or BIASi) = 
β0 + β1 DISPi + β2 DISPi × TREATi+ β3 DISPi × POSTi + β4 DISPi × POSTi × TREATi   + β5 TREATi + β6 
POSTi + β7 POSTi × TREATi + βk Controlki + εi. The dependent variable is the stock return of the 
following month (RET) or the upward bias in the mean reported forecast (BIAS). The set of control 
variables in Panel C includes firm size, book-to-market ratio, momentum, and each characteristic’s 
interactions with POST, TREAT and POST × TREAT. In Panels B and C, POST is based on the calendar 
year in which the mean forecast is reported, and test statistics are based on standard errors clustered by 
both stock and calendar month. For simplicity, we omit the coefficients on the control variables.   
                                                            
26 Since we use the method of “demeaning” to control time fixed effect, the coefficient on POST is not 
available. The results are similar if time fixed effect is controlled in Panels B and C. 
Panel A: Dependent variable =Average daily abnormal return around analysts’ forecast revision 
 Estimate  t-statistics    
FREV -0.05 (-0.76) 
FREV× TREAT 0.21 (2.39) 
FREV× POST 0.07 (1.00) 
FREV× TREAT × POST -0.20 (-1.94) 
TREAT -0.23 (-1.23)    
TREAT × POST 0.24 (0.83) 
Panel B: Dependent variable = Monthly forecast accuracy 
 Estimate  t-statistics    
TREAT 0.46 (4.27) 
POST 0.09 (0.84) 
TREAT × POST -0.32 (-2.69) 
Panel C: Dependent variable = Monthly stock return                           Monthly forecast bias 
Estimate  t-statistics Estimate  t-statistics 
DISP -0.18 (-1.15) -0.12 (-3.17) 
DISP × TREAT -2.64 (-3.49) 0.72 (3.05) 
DISP × POST 0.01 (0.02) 0.00 (0.11) 
DISP × TREAT × POST 3.16 (2.67) -0.59 (-2.44) 
TREAT -0.80 (-0.23) 0.89 (1.85) 
POST -9.76 (-2.08) 0.01 (0.03) 
TREAT × POST 10.31 (1.48) -0.06 (-0.10) 
Online Appendix: Sample selection of non-U.S. stocks 
This appendix explains the procedure we use to construct the non-U.S. sample.  
Step 1: Retrieve summary statistics of analysts’ earnings forecasts for international firms from 
the I/B/E/S summary file.  
There are two types of summary files in I/B/E/S: an adjusted file (file name: 
STATSUM_EPSINT in WRDS) and an unadjusted file (file name: STATSUMU_EPSINT in WRDS). 
Following Diether et al. (2002), we rely on the summary statistics from the unadjusted file to calculate 
forecast dispersion in order to avoid the problems caused by I/B/E/S adjustment for stock splits. 
However, the unadjusted file does not include actual earnings-per-share (EPS), which is a variable 
needed to calculate forecast bias. Actual EPS (after adjustment for stock splits) is included in the 
adjusted file. Hence, we need to match the unadjusted summary forecast statistics with the adjusted 
actual EPS and make sure they are on the same scale with respect to stock splits. To achieve this, we 
follow the method in Glushkov (2009). Specifically, we merge the unadjusted file with the adjusted 
file to back out the split factor, with which we obtain the unadjusted actual EPS. In this matching 
process, it is important to ensure that the currency code of forecast statistics (CURCODE in I/B/E/S) 
is the same as the currency code of actual EPS (CURR_ACT in I/B/E/S). We focus on current fiscal-
year annual EPS forecasts (i.e., FPI =1 in I/B/E/S). This process results in 2,469,933 firm-month 
observations with no missing unadjusted actual EPS whose forecast statistic dates (STATPERS in 
I/B/E/S) fall between January 1990 and November 2013 from the I/B/E/S universe. Our sample starts 
in January 1990 because Datastream begins to provide stock return data for a large number of 
international firms in 1990. Our sample ends in November 2013 because forecast statistics will later 
be matched with the following month’s return, which ends in December 2013 (i.e., the last month of 
our return data).  
Step 2: Match the I/B/E/S identifier TICKER with the Datastream identifier DSCD.  
TICKER is the unique identifier for each firm in I/B/E/S, and DSCD is the unique six-digit 
identifier for each stock. Among the 2,469,933 firm-month observations retrieved in step 1, there are 
34,415 unique TICKERs. We create a list based on the 34,415 TICKERs and then retrieve the 
corresponding DSCD for each TICKER from Datastream. Each of 34,415 TICKERs is matched with 
one unique DSCD. However, there is one case where one DSCD (= 14653D) is associated with two 
TICKERs. We manually check this case and choose the correct match. Therefore, we obtain 34,414 
unique TICKER-DSCD matches. It’s important to note that in this matching process, we search DSCD 
for TICKER because this process normally results in a firm’s primarily listed stock. If we reverse this 
process (i.e., searching TICKER for DSCD), one TICKER is often matched with different DSCDs 
when a firm has several listings.  
Step 3: Select stocks meeting our criteria.  
The 34,414 stocks in step 2 are from 92 countries.  Unless otherwise specified, we identify a 
stock's country based on the location of its primary exchange (GEOLN in Datastream). Among these 
92 countries, many countries will not have enough observations to calculate a reliable dispersion 
effect, especially countries that began to have records on I/B/E/S only recently.  In order to reduce our 
data collection effort, we delete those countries for which I/B/E/S begins to provide forecasts after 
year 1995, which results in 47 countries and 31,415 stocks. As in Chui et al. (2010), we include only 
stocks traded on the primary stock exchanges in each country, which results in 31,188 stocks. 
Furthermore, we include only primary listings (i.e., requiring Primary = 'P' in Datastream and 
excluding those stocks with missing information on primary listing status), which results in 28,421 
stocks.  
Step 4: Retrieve monthly stock return from Datastream.  
We match our refined sample of 28,421 stocks in step 2 with the forecast sample in step 1, 
which results in 2,196,359 stock-month observations. These observations are merged with the stock 
returns of the following month. We calculate monthly stock return using monthly return index (RI in 
Datastream) denominated in U.S. dollars. One issue with the return index in Datastream is that after a 
stock is delisted, the return indexes after delisting are copied for later periods, which results in a 
trailing of zero returns. Following Ince and Porter (2006), we delete all monthly return observations 
from the end of the sample period to the first nonzero return.
1
 Only 1.5% of the above 2,196,359 firm-
month observations have missing returns in the following month. 
Step 5: Delete observations with missing variables and potential data errors. 
We delete observations with missing forecast dispersion, which is defined as the ratio of the 
standard deviation of analysts’ current fiscal-year annual earnings-per-share forecasts (i.e., forecasts 
of forthcoming earnings-per-share) to the absolute value of the mean forecast. This results in 
1,628,098 stock-month observations. We then delete 368 observations with missing market 
capitalization (MV in Datastream). We also delete 1,350 observations whose earnings announcement 
date (ANNDATS_ACT in I/B/E/S) is prior to the fiscal year end (FPEDATS in I/B/E/S), 12,207 
observations whose forecast statistic date (STATPERS in I/B/E/S) is later than the earnings 
announcement date, and 33,256 observations whose forecast statistic date is more than 12 months 
prior to the earnings announcement date. These observations are likely to be data errors. These criteria 
result in 1,580,917 stock-month observations. Next, we delete observations with holding period 
returns at the top and bottom 1% within each country, as many of these extreme returns are likely to 
be the result of coding error (McLean et al. 2009). We also delete observations with forecast error, 
calculated as the absolute value of the difference between monthly consensus forecast and actual 
                                            
1
 Another method adopted in the literature to address this issue is to delete returns with non-positive trading 
volumes. We find that for some countries (e.g., Germany), Datastream begins to have records on trading volume 
later than it begins to have records on return index. This means that using the method of deleting returns with 
non-positive trading volumes will result in the deletion of many valid return observations. Hence, we do not use 
this method. 
earnings-per-share scaled by the latter, at the top 99% within each country
2
, because these forecasts 
are likely to be the results of data errors. This results in 1,533,909 stock-month observations. 
Step 6: Select countries with sufficient observations. 
For each month we limit our sample to countries with at least 100 observations. We also delete 
countries with a return history of fewer than 60 months over our sample period, which runs from 
February 1990 to December 2013. This results in 1,241,339 stock-month observations from 23 non-
U.S. countries.  
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 The lower bound of forecast error is 0. 
